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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue for determination by this Court is whether 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-24 applies to plaintiffs, a group of 
former State employees who were disqualified from participation in 
the Utah State Retirement system when their public employer was sold 
to a private entity. Plaintiffs have submitted to the Court their 
argument that the statute does not apply because mass 
disqualification caused by an entire unit being forced to withdraw 
was neither anticipated nor contemplated by the provisions of the 
Retirement Act. In their brief, plaintiffs set forth the following 
four-part analysis showing the inapplicability of § 49-10-24 and 
demonstrating plaintiffs' right to restitution of employer 
contributions made on their behalf. Plaintiffs submit that this 
unrebutted analysis compels reversal of the summary judgment 
rendered below. 
1. Plaintiffs1 employer contributions were 
compensation in the form of "deferred wages". 
2. Plaintiffs1 interests in their deferred wages are 
entitled to legal protection even before plaintiffs attain 
"vested benefits". 
3. Although plaintiffs normally would have to satisfy 
the pension system's statutory vesting schedule before enjoying 
their deferred wages, unanticipated circumstances which render 
such satisfaction impossible give plaintiffs an immediate 
equitable claim for restitution. 
4. The Retirement Act completely failed to 
contemplate the mass disqualification and forfeiture caused by 
the sale of Payson City Hospital to an ineligible private 
corporation. 
Plaintiffs do not wish to further burden the Court with a 
detailed discussion of the points made in its initial brief. 
-1-
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Instead, plaintiffs note only that they are relying on the sound 
analysis presented above and discussed in detail in their initial 
brief and herein will discuss only briefly defendant's unfounded 
collateral objections. 
Defendant has chosen to sidestep almost completely 
plaintiffs1 four points, instead attempting to distract the Court 
from the main issue by raising collateral issues, using unfounded 
scare tactics about the possible effect of a ruling in plaintiffs' 
favor, making sweeping unsupported generalizations and bald 
conclusions, and misinterpreting and misapplying case law. 
Defendant makes unjustified quantum leaps of logic to 
arrive at its conclusion that summary judgment should be upheld. 
First, demonstrating either bravado or its inability to rebut 
plaintiffs1 arguments, defendant refuses to "distinguish or attack 
the legal sanctity" of plaintiffs' private retirement system cases, 
observing that public retirement systems are not private retirement 
systems. (Respondents' Brief at 3). Plaintiffs show in Section I 
that the uncontemplated mass withdrawal presents identical problems 
in public or private systems and that the law allows recovery of 
employer contributions in such instances. 
Second, defendant proposes that because the Utah State 
Retirement System is a Defined Benefit Plan that plaintiffs' desired 
recovery is somehow inappropriate. In Section II, plaintiffs 
demonstrate that their analysis is entirely consistent with a 
"Defined Benefit Plan" and that this issue is a "red herring" having 
little, if anything, to do with the issues before this Court. 
-2-
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Third, defendant submits that Bryson v. Utah State 
Retirement Office 573 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978), is controlling in 
this case. Section III will show that not only is defendant's 
all-or-nothing reliance on Bryson seriously misplaced but also 
defendant's other cited cases miss the mark, dealing either with 
demands by individual terminated employees in the face of statutes 
expressly forbidding any refund, or with claims for denied pension 
benefits -- neither applicable in this instance. 
Fourth, defendant argues that somehow "equity" cannot be 
relied on by plaintiffs because "he who seeks equity must do 
equity." (Respondent's Brief at 12) While it is difficult to 
understand defendant's equity argument, it appears to be an attempt 
to quantify the amount of harm (benefit) Payson City's withdrawal 
had on the retirement system. Plaintiffs show in Section IV that 
this issue must await trial and is not now before this Court for 
determination. 
Finally, defendant argues that the enactment of § 49-10-11 
indicates that the 1967 Retirement Act did not contemplate mass 
termination and forfeiture. Plaintiffs1 final section will show 
that, at best, the 1983 modification was a recognition of the 
deficiency in S 49-10-24 which plaintiffs claim entitles them to 
relief. 
Defendant's attempts to flavor its vapid arguments by 
sweeping unsupported statements, i.e. "It would be a direct reversal 
of the law in this jurisdiction and in every other jurisdiction in 
these United States (where it was followed) as it relates to public 
-3-
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defined benefit plans." (Respondent's Brief at 7.); "The whole 
funding base would have to be reconsidered and recalculated." 
(Respondent's Brief at 7.); "Neither law nor equity is of aid to 
these plaintiffs' as they seek to recover sums universally denied 
public employees under defined benefit plans in the jurisidictions 
of the United States." Respondent's Brief at 15; fail to breathe 
life into defendant's arguments, none of which are of value in 
determining whether § 49-10-24 of the Utah State Retirement Act 
contemplated the mass disqualification of plaintiffs. In fact, 
defendant has admitted that the 1967 Legislature had never expressly 
considered this possibility. (Statement of Proceedings For Which No 
Transcript Was Made, Addendum to Brief of Appellants 2-4). 
The summary judgment below must be reversed and plaintiffs 
allowed to prove the amount, if any, to which they are entitled. 
I. PRIVATE PENSION CASES ARE APPLICABLE 
Because defendant has chosen not to discuss or dispute 
plaintiffs' cases involving private retirement systems, such case 
law stands unrebutted before this court if defendant's distinction 
between private and public cases is faulty. Plaintiffs submit that 
such distinction is not only faulty, it is almost nonexistent. 
At page 3 of its Brief, defendant states its only basis of 
distinction — a public retirement system is "created and governed 
by legislative authority and not 'negotiation' and 'contract' as in 
private systems." On this thin reed of distinction hangs^ 
defendant's response and plaintiffs' only obstacle to relief, for 
the cases of Lucas v. Seagrave, 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 
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1967), Kenneke v, First National Bank of Chicago, 105 111. App. 
3d 630, 434 N.E.2d 495 (1982), prior appeal 65 111. App. 3d 10, 
382 N.E.2d 309 (1978), and Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. Ill, 
287 N.Y.S. 281 (1936), as well as Bernstein, Employee 
Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952 
(1963) are authority directly on point allowing plaintiffs1 recovery. 
Defendant's bald assertion notwithstanding, it is clear 
that public pension systems are contractual as well as statutory. 
The relationship of the parties under the Utah State Retirement 
Act is contractual as well as statutory. Driggs y. Utah 
State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 422, 434, 142 
P.2d 657, 659, 664 (1943); Cfty of West Jordan v. Utah State 
Retirement Office, Civ. No. C82-6157, Memorandum Decision, 
at 6 (3d. Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah July 29, 1983) (record at 319). 
The defendant argued below that private pension cases such as 
Lucas, Longhine and Kenneke are irrelevant in an 
action against a public pension fund. This Court, however, 
specifically rejected that argument in Driggs, 105 Utah at 
427-28, 142 P.2d at 661-62. 
Brief of Appellants at 22, n. 3. 
As has been previously pointed out, under Utah's retirement 
system the proportion of contributions paid by employees and 
employers is the subject of negotiation at the legislative level. 
For example, participating public employers contribute more than 
employees in the Public Safety Retirement System, the Firemen 
Retirement System and the Judges' Retirement System; but employer 
and employee contributions are equal in the Public Employees Utah 
State Retirement System. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 43, 44. 
Defendant has admitted that the basis for the discrepancy.between 
the retirement funds is "[njegotiation by the individual groups when 
-5-
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establishing a program. The law being an effort at the legislature, 
a compromise between employer and employees." Id. 
The promise of a particular contribution level by employer 
and employee acts as inducement to prospective employees to become 
employees. Employees rely on the represented level of contribution 
when they accept the offer of employment. Attempts to change the 
terms of this contract without the employees' consent have failed. 
See e.g., Driggs, 105 Utah 417. 
It should be noted that even the cases cited by the 
defendant (Brief of Respondent at 9), although irrelevant for 
determining the scope of plaintiffs1 rights in a mass termination 
suit, note that public pension systems are by nature contractual. 
It is therefore clear that the public retirement system, 
while created by legislative authority, is also subject to 
"negotiation" and "contract" as in the private system. Plaintiffs1 
private cases are thus applicable and controlling in the absence of 
authority to the contrary. Plaintiffs submit that Lucas, 
Kenneke and Longhine should be examined carefully by this 
Court as they are sufficient authority for plaintiffs to prevail in 
this case.i/ 
h/ Defendant's statement that restitution has not 
been awarded to employees suffering mass termination in any public 
pension case is true because the principles recognized in 
plaintiffs' private pension cases have not been advanced against a 
public pension in any reported case. It is equally true that there 
is no public case supporting defendant's position. However, in 
light of Driggs and in the absence of any reasoning in 
defendant's brief, plaintiffs' private pension cases must control 
and dictate relief for plaintiffs. 
-6-
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II. DEFENDANT'S DEFINED BENEFIT - DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION DISTINCTION IS MEANINGLESS 
Defendant goes to great lengths attempting to draw a 
distinction between a defined benefit plan and a defined 
contribution plan. While such distinction is interesting, it is 
entirely unhelpful in resolving the issue before this Court and, in 
fact, seem to be a "red herring" which could distract the Court. 
Simply stated, plaintiffs1 claims are not dependent upon 
the nature or type of retirement plan. Plaintiffs seek relief 
from the plan because their circumstance was not contemplated 
nor forseen, they do not seek relief through a defined benefit 
plan or defined contribution plan. If the defined benefit plan or 
defined contribution plan provided for mass termination, then the 
relief sought by plaintiffs is consistent with such plan; but since 
plaintiffs' claim is that § 49-10-24 does not provide for mass 
termination, the distinction between the two types of plans is 
irrelevant. 
Other authorities do not distinguish between types of 
plans. In 26 U.S.C. S 411(d)(3) the ERISA requirements for 
immediate vesting upon partial termination caused by mass discharge 
of employees apply regardless of whether the pension plan is defined 
benefit or contribution. Additionally defendant's purported 
distinction is not raised in any pension case similar to the present 
one. 
Defendant emphasizes that in a defined benefit plan, the 
risk of investment is on the State. The corollary to this statement 
-7-
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is that any unanticipated forfeitures inure to the benefit of the 
State. The Utah State Retirement System is funded on an assumption 
of normal individual employee turnover. (See Brief of Appellant at 
5.) If mass forfeiture by a disqualified class exceeds normal 
employee turnover, then the State is not required to contribute as 
much money to fund the pension system. In such a situation the fund 
has collected money on an assumption that fewer people would leave 
(resulting in higher contributions) than actually left. When the 
mass termination occurs, a windfall to the system results. Mass 
forfeitures permit the employer to save substantial amounts of money 
in contribution obligations. 
Defendant argues that fl[t]he actuarial rate is determined 
and the employer-employee contributions fixed in a defined benefit 
plan upon the assumption that the employer contribution is in all 
cases, other than to receive benefits of the plan, nonrefundable." 
Defendant then predicts severe mischief if the Court disturbs this 
actuarial assumption. The Lucas decision shows the error in 
this falsely ominous argument, 
[I]t has been asserted that an employer's pension plan 
contributions are determined by an actuarial formula which 
assumes that any employee whose employment is terminated 
forfeits his pension benefits. [citation ommitted] However, 
such an assumption may not cover the occurrence of a group 
termination. The actuarial formula assumes a reasonable 
turnover rate for employees established by experience with 
individual separations over a period of time. Where there is a 
termination of a substantial number of the plan participants, it 
seems clear that such a turnover is not anticipated by the 
formula. The result is that an employer who has discharged a 
relatively large number of employees receives a windfall, 
palpably in excess of actuarial assumptions, in the form of 
-8-
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pension credit forfeitures which he can use to relieve for some 
time his future premium liability for the remaining employees. 
Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 345. 
Plaintiffs submit that in any event the actuarial rate 
issue is not before the Court and consideration of it should be 
reserved for trial of the amount recoverable by plaintiffs. 
III. DEFENDANT'S LEGAL AUTHORITY IS NOT CONTROLLING 
Defendant's heavy reliance on Bryson v. Utah State 
Retirement Office, 573 P. 2d 1280 (Utah 1978) is unfounded. 
Bryson simply held that it is not a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause to provide refunds for policeman and fireman which 
are different than refunds for other types of public employees. The 
Court's straight-forward ruling could not be interpreted to stand 
for the proposition that employee contributions (and therefore 
employer contributions) are not employee "property". Bryson 
does not define the scope of employee rights relative to 
contributions. Its holding rests on a finding of a reasonable 
classification scheme and not on the existence or non-existence of 
"property" rights. The nature of plaintiffs' rights to 
contributions is covered fully in their initial brief and is 
supported by Utah case law as well as general legal authority. 
(See, Brief of Appellants at 13-18.) 
This case involves no constitutional issues, and none was 
argued in the summary judgment below. Instead, this case turns upon 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-24; specifically 
whether it contemplated.mass disqualification of an entire employee 
-9-
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work force. The Bryson case was simply a different case 
involving different issues. 
The other cases cited by defendants are equally 
inapplicable to the instant case. Defendant cites numerous cases 
for the proposition that no terminating public employee has received 
a refund of employer contributions. (Brief of Respondent at 9, 
14.) All of the cases cited concern constitutional claims and fall 
into two entirely distinguishable categories — claims for denied 
pension benefits, e.g., Duff v. City of Gardena, 167 Cal. 
Rptr. 4, (1980), or demands for refunds by individual terminated 
employees in the face of statutes expressly forbidding any refunds, 
e.g. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of the Police 
Pension Fund of the City of Shreveport, 370 S.2d 528 ( 1979). 
All defendant's cases involved terminations of individual 
employees in the regular course of their employment, none involved 
mass terminations or unforseen circumstances. Each is 
constitutional in nature, attacking the validity of the forfeiture 
provision rather than the applicability of the provision to 
unforseen mass termination. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' EQUITABLE CLAIM IS PROPER 
Defendant makes two arguments why plaintiffs should not be 
entitled to seek relief in equity. First, defendant points to 
certain liabilities which it has incurred on behalf of employees of 
Payson City Hospital. These liabilities are not inconsistent with a 
request for restitution. Defendant's argument simply raises the 
question of how its unjust enrichment should be measured. 
-10-
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Plaintiffs recognize the possibility that defendant may be 
entitled to certain set-offs in the ultimate accounting. The 
propriety of any particular set-off, however, has not yet been 
briefed by the parties because plaintiffs1 motion for partial 
summary judgment reserved the determination of the amount of 
recovery for trial. The record indicates that such determination 
will likely require the assistance of actuarial expertise. 
(Comparison of testimony by Kent Cannon and Robert Wilcox before the 
Utah State Retirement Board, record at 143-47.) In any event, the 
Lucas court clearly stated that recovery in the mass termination 
context "is actuarially manageable" and "will not act to dilute the 
interests of the employees who remain participants." 277 F. Supp. 
at 346. 
Second, defendant argues that equitable relief is not 
available if the statute expressly limits available relief. 
Obviously, this argument merely begs the question. The very relief 
sought by plaintiffs in their motion is a declaration that § 49-10-24 
is inapplicable under the circumstances. 
V. THE 1983 ENACTMENT OF § 49-10-11 DOES NOT 
INDICATE THAT THE 1967 RETIREMENT ACT 
CONTEMPLATED MASS TERMINATION AND FORFEITURE 
Defendant's suggestion that Senate Bill 327 (1983 Utah 
Laws Ch. 224, S§ 6, 12, codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 49-10-11(4)) demonstrates that the Retirement Act has always 
applied to mass terminations, is unfounded. Defendant relies on the 
title of Senate Bill 327, not itself law, for the proposition 
that the new S 49-10-11(4) merely "clarifies" the intended scope of 
-11-
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S 49-10-24. The time frame of this purported "clarificaton" is 
extremely important: Section 49-10-24 was passed in 1967. 
Plaintiffs filed this suit in 1978. This Court issued a written 
opinion regarding this case, dated November 25, 1980. Finally 16 
years after the original legislation was passed and 5 years 
after this lawsuit was filed and gained considerable attention, the 
legislature began giving consideration to the problem of 
disqualified employer units. 
Defendant's claim that the 1983 amendment merely expresses 
what the 1967 legislature clearly understood is not supportable. As 
set forth in Appellant's Brief (pp. 23-26), defendant has admitted 
that the 1967 legislature never even thought about the problem 
involved in this case. 
Plaintiffs would agree that the 1983 legislature could 
choose to place the risk of future employer unit disqualification 
and mass terminations on the public employees. That is in fact the 
logical meaning of Senate Bill 327fs "clarification." Under no 
circumstances, however, can risks that were never allocated under 
the pension system between 1967 and 1983 be retroactively 
distributed to negate plaintiffs1 cause of action. Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-3. This Court must assume that the 1983 legislature 
acted properly by recognizing an existing problem and then 
legislating future rights. 
Finally, defendant argues that the language of § 49-10-24 
is clear in its application to plaintiffs. The Court need only read 
the forfeiture provisions in Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. Ill, 
-12-
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287 N.Y.S. 281 (1936) and Kenneke v. First National Bank of 
Chicago, 105 111. App. 3d 630, 434 N.E.2d 495 (1982) to find 
equally expansive language which those courts refused to apply to 
circumstances outside the parties1 reasonable anticipation. See 
also discussion in Lucas v. Seagrove, 277 F. Supp. 338, 342-46 
(D. Minn. 1967). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has raised no argument which rebutts plaintiff's 
four-part analysis showing that plaintiff's are entitled to the 
relief sought. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reversal of the 
District Court's Order granting Summary Judgment to defendant and 
denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (jy^ day of August, 1985. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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